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‘Obsessed with goals’:
Functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans
Gergely Csibra
Birkbeck, University of London
György Gergely
Institute for Psychology, Budapest
Humans show a strong and early inclination to interpret observed behaviours of others as goal-directed
actions. We identify two main epistemic functions that this 'teleological obsession' serves: on-line
prediction and social learning. We show how teleological action interpretations can serve these functions
by drawing on two kinds of inference (‘action-to-goal’ or ‘goal-to-action’), and argue that both types of
teleological inference constitute inverse problems that can only be solved by further assumptions. We
pinpoint the assumptions that three currently proposed mechanisms of goal attribution (action-effect
associations, simulation procedures, and teleological reasoning) imply, and contrast them with the
functions they are supposed to fulfil. We argue that while action-effect associations and simulation
procedures are generally well suited to serve on-line action monitoring and prediction, social learning of
new means actions and artefact functions requires the inferential productivity of teleological reasoning.
Human beings cannot help but interpret the actions
they observe in functional terms. In fact, the very
notion of 'action' implies a motor behaviour
performed by an agent, which is conceived in relation
to the end state it is destined to achieve, even if this
end state is not attained in every particular instance of
an action. Plenty of evidence shows that even young
human infants are inclined to interpret at least certain
types of behaviours as goal-directed actions. However,
there is no consensus about how they achieve this,
and what factors influence their interpretation of
others’ observed behaviours as goal-directed actions
(Csibra, 2003; Gergely, 2003; Hauf & Prinz, 2005;
Woodward, Sommerville, & Guajardo, 2001).
In this paper, we take the 'functional stance' to
interpret people's 'functional stance' towards actions.
In other words, we ask what funct ions humans’
obsession with goals serve, why we prefer to see
others' behaviours as means to ends. Having outlined
potential answers to the question of functions, we
shall survey the mechanisms that various current
theories propose for goal attribution, and consider
them in relation to the functions we identified. We
shall argue that these different mechanisms of goal
attribution differ in how well they can fulfil one or the
other of the functions in question. We close our
arguments with speculations about the developmental
significance of early goal attribution in human infants.
1 The functions of goal attribution
Teleological interpretations of actions in terms of
goals tell us why the action has been performed or, in
other words, it provides a special type of explanation
for the action. What is the benefit that we gain from
such an explanation?
Keil (2006) lists several functions of explanations in
general, and most of them are applicable to
teleological explanations of actions as well. Attributing
a goal to an observed action allows us to predict its
further course, to evaluate the action's causal efficacy
in terms of its outcomes, and to justify the action.
(Other explanatory reasons, like providing diagnosis
and gaining aesthetic pleasure are perhaps less
applicable to teleological interpretations of actions.1)
While predicting the future course of an on-going
action can be clearly locally advantageous to the
observer, the other two functions provide mostly
long-term benefits that arise as a result of the specific
way they construe and represent the observed
actions. In particular, the evaluation of causal efficacy
of an action allows us to learn about novel means to
achieve desirable goal states, and justifying an action in
terms of a goal enables us to learn about its function
or the function of the tools employed by the action.
Below we will discuss these different functions of goal
attribution in turn.
1.1 Goal prediction and action anticipation
There are at least two ways in which goal attribution
allows predicting future events. The more trivial one is
due to the fact that a goal represents a state or an
event subsequent to the action it belongs to. Thus, as
long as goal attribution is made on-line, concurrent
with action observation, goals refer to and predict
future states or events. Since goals are normally
                                                 
1 The remaining function in Keil's (2006) list, 'affixing blame', is often
behind goal attributions in everyday life. People tend to think that
actors are more responsible for the intended than the unintended
outcomes of their actions, i.e., for those that served as goals rather
than arose as by-products of a particular action. Human infants
(Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005) and chimpanzees (Call,
Hare, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2004) are also sensitive to this
distinction and are likely to rely on it in their appraisal of social
partners. Goal attribution may also support joint collaborative
actions, which allow cooperation between individuals (Tomasello et
al., 2005). As here we are focusing on epistemic functions, we are
not going to discuss these 'social' functions of goal attribution in the
present paper.
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accomplished, goal attribution to not-yet-completed
actions implies, by definition, a specific kind of
prediction.2 For example, if you observe someone's
behaviour in the kitchen and interpret it as 'coffee
making', you will by virtue of this interpretation
predict the appearance of a cup (or more cups) of
coffee in the kitchen in the near future. Inferring goals
from actions inherently involves a reference to some
future state.
There is, however, a less trivial way as well by
which goals help predicting future events. While goal
attribution itself allows us to jump ahead in time and
predict a hypothesized future state, it also enables us
to fill up the intervening time by action anticipation. For
example, interpreting an action as 'coffee making'
would allow you to anticipate that the actor will take
water from a source (tap or bottle), will apply heat to
the water (in a kettle or on the hob), will put coffee
into a container (cup, filter, or coffee machine), etc.
The exact details of these predictions will depend on
environmental circumstances, your knowledge about
artefacts and procedures, about the actor's habits,
abilities and preferences, and further (for example,
verbal) information you may obtain in the particular
situation. Clearly, however, the content of your action
predictions will be most crucially determined by the
specific goal implied by your interpretation of the
observed action as an instance of 'coffee making'. As
the example suggests, action predictions from goals
can be made by breaking down the path towards the
goal into sub-goals in a hierarchical fashion, eventually
arriving at elementary motor acts, like grasping or
stepping, at the finest resolution.
The benefit of generating action anticipation at
such a fine-grained level is that it enables us to track
and monitor others' actions, which in turn enables
revising our action interpretation if our predictions
are not confirmed, or intervening in relevant ways if
we feel it necessary. If you anticipate the actor putting
instant coffee into the cup, but you observe that she is
reaching towards the box with tea bags in it, you will
change your original goal attribution from 'coffee
making' to 'tea making', or you can notify her that you
do not like tea (assuming that you think that the
actor's ultimate goal is to offer you a cup of hot
beverage), or you can inform her about the actual
contents of the box (tea bags) in case you suspect that
she is acting on a false belief. Such on-line tracking and
anticipating of ongoing events is not restricted to
action interpretation, but is characteristic to all
domains of dynamic event perception (Wilson &
Knoblich, 2005).
The crucial difference between the two kinds of
prediction that teleological action interpretation
permits is in the direction of inference they involve
(Table 1). Predicting a future goal state from
                                                 
2 Sometimes we predict not accomplishment but failure for
observed actions. However, even when this is the case, we make
our predictions with reference to the goal (the intended outcome)
of the action.
interpreting an ongoing action represents an 'action-
to-goal' inference ('What is the function of this
action?'), while during action anticipation the inference
goes in the opposite direction from 'goal-to-action'
('What action would achieve that goal?'). As we have
seen, action perception in real life involves both kinds
of inference and both kinds of prediction intertwined,
as we constantly revise goals and sub-goals attributed
to actors on the basis of verified or disconfirmed
action predictions. Nevertheless, it is important to
maintain the distinction between these two kinds of
inferences because, as we shall see, they require
different types of computations.
Type of Inference
Primary
Function
'Action-to-Goal' 'Goal-to-Action'
On-line
Prediction
Goal prediction:
Predicting the likely
effect of an ongoing
action
Action anticipation:
Predictive tracking of
dynamic actions in
real time
Social
Learning
Discovering novel
goals and artefact
functions
Acquiring novel
means actions by
evaluating their causal
efficacy in bringing
about the goal
Table 1. The functions of teleological interpretation of
actions
1.2 Social learning of novel means actions and
novel goals
When we interpret an action as goal-directed, we
conceive of it as playing a causal role in bringing about
its goal state, rather than just being coincidental with
it. If the action, or some aspect of it, is novel to us,
relating it to the goal will represent the action as a
novel means that can be successfully used to achieve
the goal state. Learning about a new action’s causal
potential to bring about a goal state is especially useful
when we have not had a means to that end in our own
action repertoire, or when the new action represents
a causally more efficient way to achieve the goal than
the means action we have formerly had access to.
Therefore, interpreting novel actions in terms of goals
can allow us to learn useful new means by observing
others use them successfully to achieve their goals.
For example, assume you see someone perform a
novel action sequence in the kitchen that involves
operating a machine you have never seen before. You
may be able to attribute to this activity the goal of
‘coffee making’ even if you are unable to extract and
understand the relevant causal factors that makes the
action sequence a successful procedure for achieving
this goal. This can happen, for example, if the actor
informs you about her goal before or while engaging in
the particular action sequence, and/or if you see that
the observed action reliably succeeds in realizing the
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goal state (as you soon end up with a cup of coffee in
front of you as a result). Thus, assigning the goal of
‘coffee making’ to a new action sequence involving the
use of a new artefact and seeing that the goal is
successfully achieved by it allows you to learn both
that the machine you have never seen before can be
used ‘for’ making coffee, and that the particular way
you observe the other operate the machine is a new
means action that can be used to achieve the goal of
coffee making.
In addition, observing successful goal-directed
actions can also inform us about the causally relevant
properties of actions, objects, and situations that enable
goal attainment. For example, observing how the
machine is operated and registering the manner in
which the action sequence is performed can highlight
and make the causally relevant information that leads
to goal achievement more readily accessible for you to
extract and represent.
Social learning of actions to achieve desirable ends
is not restricted to humans. In fact, much of the
literature on animal social learning focuses on
transmission of innovative behaviour among individuals
by observational means (Heyes & Galef, 1996). The
vast majority of the reported instances of social
learning via observation in non-human animal species
represent behaviours that lead to instantaneous
rewards (usually food) to the actor. According to
some theorists, local adaptivity of the observed
behaviour is indeed a precondition for social learning
to occur in non-human animals (Galef, 1995; Heyes,
1993). Thus, individuals of various species seem to
acquire means actions from each other as long as the
end result of the action is familiar and desirable for
them. Note that, similarly to humans, non-human
animals may also gain knowledge about the causally
relevant aspects of an observed action in relation to
the goal state. They may rely on such knowledge when
producing their own way to achieve the same
outcome (i.e., when they ‘emulate’, see Tomasello,
1996). Alternatively, if the observed action does not
allow them to extract such relevant causal knowledge,
they may opt to blindly ‘copy’ the actual action
sequence as faithfully as they can in order to secure
the attainment of the same desired outcome (i.e., they
‘imitate’, see Horner & Whiten, 2005).3
Social learning of new means (as discussed so far)
allows us to figure out what action is to be performed
(or what tool is to be used) to achieve a certain goal.
Thus, this kind of learning matches actions to goals,
means to ends, artefacts to functions. Sometimes,
however, the new information that we derive from
the teleological interpretation of an observed action is
not about new means actions but about new goals the
actions can be used to achieve. For example, you see
your friend pouring the freshly brewed coffee from
one cup into another, then she washes up the first
                                                 
3 For a more detailed discussion of this distinction, see Gergely &
Csibra (in press).
cup, pours the coffee back into it, then she washes up
the second cup, and repeats this sequence several
times. None of these actions are novel to you; yet, the
whole sequence does not make sense at first sight.
Then you notice that by the end of this action
sequence your cup of coffee that was too hot to drink
to start with becomes cooler and ready to be
consumed. This leads you realize that your friend was
probably in a hurry and wanted to quickly cool down
your coffee to a consumable temperature without
diluting it. In other words, since this desirable
outcome justifies the action sequence that brought it
about so successfully, it will be attributed as its goal
leading you to learn a new goal (as well as identifying
the action sequence as a means to achieve this goal).
Again, your learning of the new goal may be based just
on observing its successful attainment by the
perceived action sequence or you may be directly
informed about it by the actor. Of course, you can
also base your inference that identifies the new goal
on your already existing causal knowledge that
washing the cups in cold water cools them and allows
them to quickly take up heat from the drink.  In either
case, by teleologically interpreting an observed event
you may learn about a new goal (e.g., that one can
quickly cool down hot coffee), while possibly also
acquiring a new means action to achieve it. Observing
such an event can also highlight and thereby facilitate
learning about the causal properties of the objects
used (cups, in this case) that are relevant to the
achievement of the new goal and that your knowledge
representation of the range of affordance properties
of this particular artefact has not contained before.
In addition, if the action is performed by a novel
tool, the goal attributed to the action can be attached
to the tool as its function. Unlike the goal of an action,
which is local to a particular incidence, functions ‘stick’
to tools even when they are not in use. One way to
characterize the function of an artefact is that it is a
'frozen' goal, for which it can be used as a tool by a
means action under a large variety of situational and
person constraints. Consequently, one can infer
artefact function from goal attribution, and such an
inference constitutes social learning of artefact
function (e.g., Casler and Kelemen, 2005). Suppose
that, instead of pouring the drink from cup to cup, you
see you friend discharge the coffee into some
equipment that circulates it under running cold water.
If you manage to figure out that the goal of this action
is to cool the coffee quickly, you have also come up
with a plausible hypothesis concerning the function of
the circulating equipment. Thus, attributing goals to
unfamiliar actions could assist social learning of
artefact functions.
Unlike social learning of means actions, social
learning of new goals and artefact functions is
extremely rare in non-human animals: in fact, this kind
of social learning may turn out to be a human-specific
phenomenon (cf. Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Gergely &
Csibra, in press). The reasons behind this are twofold.
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First, although non-human animals, and especially non-
human primates, are said to develop cultures that are
qualitatively not different from those of humans
(Laland & Hoppitt, 2003; Whiten, Horner, & Marshall-
Pescini, 2003), they certainly lack the rich variety of
artefacts that are a characteristic feature of all human
cultures. In fact, the repertoire of objects that are
used as tools by non-human species seems severely
limited (similarly to the range and types of goals they
pursue, see below). Thus, the need for specialized
mechanisms for learning artefact function does not
seem to arise in other species. Additionally, despite
the ample evidence for tool use in primates (Boesch &
Boesch, 1993) and birds (Weir, Chappel, & Kacelnik,
2002), there is no indication that individuals of any of
these species would conceptualize the objects they
use as tools as possessing permanent functions that
would be represented as their essential property.
Unlike humans, other animals do not routinely store
their 'tools' for later use (but see Mulcahy & Call,
2006), neither do they invent, design, manufacture,
and maintain tools, and they rarely transport them for
long distances (see also Csibra & Gergely, 2006;
Gergely & Csibra, in press). Second, and relatedly, the
range of goals that non-human animals pursue differs
enormously from that of humans. Because of the
human capacity for recursive tool use (using tools to
make other tools) and the human inclination to
represent multi-level hierarchies of goals, humans
pursue a wide variety of goals that very often do not
serve their immediate adaptive needs, but function as
local sub-goals to some distant end. For a human
observer, this multitude of different types of goals that
are nevertheless useful to acquire simply because they
may function as valuable sub-goals for the observer's
own goal-directed activities in the future. As non-
human animals are normally not engaged in long
sequences of novel actions that have their useful effect
only in the distant future, but pursue a highly
restricted – and mostly innately specified – set of local
goals that are familiar to them and their conspecifics
(food, mating partner, shelter, territorial protection
etc.), they do not learn novel goals by observation.
2 Goal attribution and action prediction as
inverse problems
So far we have concentrated on the functions of goal
attribution (the w h y question), but we have
systematically treated the issue of how  goals are
extracted from actions by observers. Before we turn
to the candidate mechanisms of goal attribution, we
have to discuss the nature of the task that these
mechanisms are required to solve.
As we have seen, both the predictive and the social
learning functions of goal attribution cover two kinds
of inferences (Table 1). In computational terms, either
the percept of an action provides the input of the
system, activating an appropriate mechanism to
identify and output the goal to be attributed to the
actor (as in goal prediction and social learning of
functions), or it is the goal that serves as the input to
the system for which the mechanism is expected to
produce a (predicted or learnt) action as the output.
The complexity of both types of computation depends
on the range of possible outputs that a system should
be able to choose from.
In case of a 'goal-to-action' type of computation
(for example, action prediction), the observer is
confronted with the problem of sorting and choosing
from the myriad of potential actions that the actor
may perform. Even if one considers only those actions
that would eventually produce the attributed goal, the
possibilities are countless. Coffee can be made many
different ways, and each sub-goal towards the end
could also be reached by countless routes. Intuitively
we all know that many of these courses of action are
rather unlikely and should not be considered seriously
(cf. the 'frame problem', Dennett, 1978; Fodor, 1983).
Your friend could start her task, for example, by
designing and building a new coffee machine, or by
planting a coffee plant in the garden, or by washing the
coffee beans in the sink, but these actions would seem
implausible for an observer. Notice that this
assessment of relative plausibility is not the input, but
the output of our action prediction system, which
must have already judged these actions as improbable.
However, if the sole input to the system is the goal to
be achieved, these actions, which would eventually
lead to goal achievement, cannot be a priori excluded
from consideration.
Because the end of an action sequence does not in
itself determine the details of the action
unambiguously, inferring actions from goals is an
inverse problem. Inverse problems are ill-defined
problems that cannot be solved by analytic methods
because the available information does not constrain
the solution sufficiently. Inverse problems are well
known in many disciplines like physics and
neuroimaging (Schmidt, George, & Wood, 1999), and
many tasks that the animal visual system has to solve
can also be conceptualized as inverse problems
(Scholl, 2005). For example, infinitely many different
arrangements of objects in the 3D space could
produce the same 2D projection on the retina, and
the visual system is confronted with the job to find the
most likely interpretation of this 2D image in the 3D
space (Marr, 1982). Similarly, infinitely many different
action sequences could produce the same end state,
and when one wants to predict actions knowing the
end result (the goal), her task is to predict the most
likely course of action from among the many possible
ones that could lead to the same end.
What about the other type of inference that we
use in goal attribution? Is it also an inverse problem to
figure out the goal of an action either online (to
predict the end state) or a posteriori (to learn goals
and artefact functions)? The answer again depends on
the range of potential goals that the observer has to
be able to consider when making this kind of
inference. For creatures that are interested only in
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goal states that carry immediate adaptive value, and
that can be easily discriminated from each other, this
range is small. When a non-human animal has
observed an action, it only has to check its end result
against a short list of known rewards (has it resulted
in food?, has it provided shelter?, etc.), and a match
will provide it with the goal to be attributed. If there is
no match, the action may not be interpreted as goal-
directed at all. Humans, however, are obsessed with
goals and can assign a goal (by coming up with a
functional explanation) for practically any action. As
we discussed in the previous section, the likely
function of this species-specific ‘teleological obsession’
is the need to learn a large variety of novel goals and
artefact functions from others.
In humans, therefore, where almost anything can
be a goal state, 'action-to-goal' inference also becomes
an inverse problem. If you observe your friend in the
kitchen pouring water from a bottle to a cup, what is
the goal? To fill the cup? To empty the bottle? To cool
(or warm up) the cup? To measure the volume of
water? To store water? To play with wet things? Or is
pouring water into the cup a sub-goal to enable one to
drink water from the cup (a further goal higher up in
the goal-hierarchy)? Our knowledge about people,
kitchens, cups, and water, and further information
about the actual situation will help us to find an
answer, but perhaps nothing in the pouring action
itself can serve as the basis for choosing among these
possibilities. Just like a certain arrangement of edges
on the retina can be projected by many arrangements
of objects in the world, an action can be performed to
achieve many different kinds of goals. The fact that our
goal attribution system could answer this question
easily in most situations is not an indication of the
simplicity of the problem, but evidence for a very
efficient goal extraction mechanism (cf. Baker,
Tenenbaum, & Saxe, in press).
Inverse problems are unsolvable by analytical
methods, but this does not entail that there is no
feasible way to find the most likely solution for such a
problem. To do this, one has to rely on further
assumptions about the nature of the phenomena –
assumptions that will constrain the number of
potential solutions to be considered. The human visual
system, for example, implicitly assumes that objects
are illuminated from above and, if no other
information resolves the ambiguities concerning the
convexity of a surface, assigns depth values to points
on the surface accordingly (Ramachandran, 1988)4. It is
important to note that the assumptions that are used
in solving inverse problems are assumptions; they do
not have to be, and are not always, true. The validity
of a solution to an inverse problem crucially depends
on the probability of the assumptions that have been
drawn upon being true. Since natural lighting on the
Earth is, indeed, coming from above, the assumption
                                                 
4 Interestingly, even newborns are sensitive to the direction of
illumination, and prefer to look at faces lit from above (Farroni et
al., 2005).
of 'illumination from above' is likely to lead to valid
solutions, unless artificial lights have been applied in
the situation. Also, the applicability of certain
assumptions may depend on the actual circumstances,
for example on the availability of some information in
the input. The assumption on illumination direction is
useless in an environment where only directionless
ambient light is present.
3 Mechanisms of goal attribution
What cognitive mechanisms are available for humans
for goal attribution and for utilizing functional
understanding of behaviours for social learning? In the
recent years, three distinct mechanisms have been
proposed for this purpose: action-effect associations,
simulation procedures, and teleological reasoning.
Evidence has been published to support the
functioning of all these mechanisms in early infancy.
We shall briefly describe these mechanisms and their
supporting evidence in turn, paying special attention to
the question of what assumptions they make to solve
the inverse problems discussed in the previous
section.
3.1 Action-effect associations
One theoretical view on action planning, summarized
by the ideomotor principle (James, 1890), emphasizes
the role of goal representation in the generation of
motor actions (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2001). According to this view, the
representation of actions in the actor's cognitive
system includes and is related to the representation of
their desired distal effects, and these inherently
related action-effect representations are linked to
each other through bidirectional associations. Thus,
the 'idea' of the goal state, i.e., the desired effect,
automatically activates the corresponding action, while
the activation of an action elicits the anticipation of the
distal effect associated with it. These links are
established by simple associations upon observing the
effects that one's actions have produced, and these
associations start to build up from early on in infancy.
An interesting extension of this approach of action
control is the idea that perceiving and understanding
other people's actions are also based on similar
bidirectional associations between actions and their
effects (e.g., Elsner, present issue). Thus, observed
actions are proposed to be represented by being
linked to the effects they have been seen to bring
about (rather than, for example, just in terms of their
antecedent conditions). As the effect of an action
normally (though not necessarily) corresponds to the
intended goal, this representation is akin to a kind of
goal attribution. Moreover, such a stored action-effect
association can be used in later occasions to predict
the goal of an ongoing action, or to anticipate the
behaviour of an observed individual with a known goal.
Human infants indeed tend to attend to the effects
of actions they observe from very early on and expect
the actor to produce the same effect again (e.g., Leslie,
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1984). Woodward (1998) demonstrated that when 6-
month-old infants see a hand repeatedly grasping one
of two objects, they anticipate that the same object
would be grasped again even when the spatial location
of the objects are rearranged. It has also been shown
that infants do not consider any end state as the effect
of the action. For example, if the hand, instead of
grasping it, just touches the object in an unfamiliar
way, it does not generate expectation of the same
ending in a new spatial arrangement (Woodward,
1999), but if the action generates a new and salient
effect, infants anticipate the same effect in a new
situation (Bíró & Leslie, in press, Király et al., 2003).
Older infants have also been shown to associate
actions and effects when the effects involved novel,
unfamiliar artefacts (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003).
When goals are attributed, or actions are
predicted, on the basis of observed action-effect
associations, the observer implicitly relies on the
assumption that an action is directed towards the
same goal state that has been produced by earlier,
similar actions, and that the a goal state (an effect) will
be achieved by an actor in a similar way, as it was
achieved before. To the degree that many of the goal-
directed actions that people perform are routine acts
that we execute the same way every time, these
assumptions will likely to lead to valid goal attributions
and action predictions. The applicability of the action-
effect associations for teleological interpretation of
actions, however, is limited by several factors. First, its
implicit assumptions do not offer a solution for either
type of inverse problem if the observed action is
novel, or if the situation does not afford the actor to
reach its goal through the familiar action that has been
associated with the goal state. Second, while an action
can be associated with a number of different distal
effects it has been observed to produce in the past,
there is no further selection mechanism to identify the
goal of the action in a particular situation. For
example, if running fast makes one sweat regularly,
when seeing someone running towards the bus-stop
behind the corner, how could one decide to assign to
the observed running action the goal of ‘catching the
bus’, instead of ‘producing sweat’?
3.2 Simulation procedures
According to an influential theory of mental state
attribution, people understand each other's mind by
imagining themselves in the other's position, and
simulatively generating the mental states (beliefs,
desires, intentions) that they would possess were they
in the other's 'shoes' (Goldman, in press; Gordon,
1986). Beyond understanding the mind states of
others, simulation procedures can also be utilized to
generate predictions about their behaviour by asking,
"What would I do in her situation?" Simulation
theories of mindreading were recently given a new
empirical boost by the discovery of mirror neurons in
monkeys and mirror neuron areas in humans (for a
review, see Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), which are
apparently similarly activated by executing and
observing a particular action.
Simulation procedures would obviously be very
useful for understanding goal-directed actions. A
predictive simulation procedure takes the goal
ascribed to the actor as its input and uses the
observer's own decision system to generate (but not
execute) the representation of the motor action that
she herself would perform to achieve the goal in
question. This simulated goal-directed action will then
be predictively attributed to the actor (Gallese &
Goldman, 1998). A 'retrodictive' (or 'postdictive')
simulation procedure could be applied in the opposite
way to recover the likely desire that generated an
observed action ("What desire would make me do
this?"), and the content of that desire would then be
attributed as the ‘goal’ of the observed action (cf.
Gergely & Csibra, 2003). The advantage of relying on
such simulation procedures rather than invoking tacit
laws, principles or models for action understanding is
that the observer can exploit his/her own existing
mental mechanisms that function to link his/her own
goals and actions.
Several theoretical accounts link the early
development of goal attribution to infants' own
abilities to perform means actions. For example,
Tomasello (1999) explains the sudden emergence of
certain social cognitive skills around 9 months of age
(the 'nine-month revolution') by the simultaneously
occurring emergence of infants' understanding of their
own selves and their own unfolding capacity for
means-end actions, and by using this self-knowledge to
interpret others' actions through simulation. Likewise,
Meltzoff (2002) argues that ascribing goals to others'
actions, and predicting their behaviour, is based on a
projection of their own experiences to the observed
actor, and the slow development of goal attribution in
infancy is explained by the gradual nature of motor
skill development. Indeed, Sommerville and
Woodward (2005) have found that infants are more
likely to attribute a goal to a means action that they
are capable of performing than to actions that are not
yet in their own action repertoire. Moreover, if they
are provided with the opportunity to gain experience
with successful goal attainment, even very young
infants tend to use this new skill for interpreting
similar observed actions of others (Sommerville,
Woodward & Needham, 2005).
Simulation procedures tackle the inverse problems
of teleological action interpretation by reducing the
possible range of solutions trough relying on the
‘equivalence’ assumption that the observed actor has
the same motor constraints and preferences as the
observer (the "like me" hypothesis, Meltzoff, 2005,
present issue). Since this assumption is to a large extent
true of conspecifics, an effective simulation may lead
to a valid solution on many occasions. These
procedures, however, cannot be used when this
assumption is obviously not met (e.g., for a non-human
actor), or when the observed action is completely
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novel that the observer has no first-person experience
with, or could not herself perform (due, say, to the
immaturity of an infant’s motor system, or to
individual motor deficits).
3.3 Teleological reasoning
An alternative theoretical approach to action
understanding emphasizes that, in order to interpret
an action as goal-directed, one has to take into
account the relevant constraints of the situation in
which the action is performed. The outcome (the
effect) of an action may, or may not, be seen as the
goal, depending on whether the outcome is judged to
justify the action in the given situation. Such normative
evaluation of actions is based on the principle of rational
action (Csibra & Gergely, 1998; Gergely & Csibra,
2003), which allows for the assessment of the relative
efficiency of the action performed to achieve the goal
within the situational constraints given.
Beyond contributing to the evaluation of whether
some behaviour is a well-formed goal-directed action
in relation to a certain end state, this principle can also
be used productively (Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely,
2003). Thus, when observing an ongoing action, one
can infer the likely goal of the action by assessing what
end state would be efficiently brought about by the
action given the particular situational constraints. This
end state then provides the goal to be attributed to
the actor. Conversely, if the goal is known, the
efficiency principle helps to generate an action
prediction by inferring what the most efficient course
of action towards the goal state would be in the given
situation. Teleological reasoning is a very flexible tool
in action understanding, but it requires the
recruitment of the relevant background knowledge
that the observer accumulated about the physical
constraints of the situation and of the actor.
We and others have collected ample evidence that
infants do engage in teleological reasoning when they
observe actions. They evaluate the efficiency of goal
approach, and predict new actions in new situations
accordingly (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, Bíró, 1995).
They apply the principle of rational action to the
interpretation of behaviours of people (Sodian,
Schoeppner, & Metz, 2004; Kamewari, Kato, Kanda,
Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005), hands (Woodward &
Sommerville, 2000; Phillips & Wellman, 2005), puppets
(Sodian, Schoeppner & Metz, 2004), robots (Kamewari
et al., 2005), geometric shapes (Gergely et al., 1995;
Csibra et al., 2003; Wagner & Carey, 2005), even
when these actors do not exhibit unambiguous agency
or animacy cues (Csibra et al., 1999). In addition,
infants take into account the efficiency of observed
new actions when they decide what aspects of them
they should imitate (Gergely et al., 2002).
The basic assumption that teleological reasoning
applies for solving the inverse problems of goal
attribution is the efficiency principle itself. Teleological
reasoning will lead to legitimate conclusions only if the
observed actor's behaviour approximates the ideal of
efficiency. Since biological systems tend conserve
energy, this assumption is likely to produce valid
predictions and goal attributions, and has been shown
to be a computationally viable way of teleological
action understanding (Baker, Tenenbaum, & Saxe, in
press). However, insufficient knowledge about the
constraints of the actor or the situation may produce
wrong predictions or goal attribution by teleological
reasoning.
4 Matching functions and mechanisms
As we have seen, all three proposed mechanisms of
teleological interpretation of actions apply
assumptions that are likely to be true in real life
situations where the problem of goal attribution
arises. If you see your friend loading coffee into the
coffee machine, you may confidently guess that her
goal is 'making coffee', because (1) this is the usual
effect associated with this action, (2) you would
typically do this when you wanted to make coffee, and
(3) this end justifies the action, considering what you
know about coffee and coffee machines. However, all
three methods carry limitations as well. If you (1) have
not yet seen anyone making coffee, or (2) have never
made coffee yourself, or (3) have no idea about the
function and relevant causal properties of the
unfamiliar machine your friend is operating, then
applying these assumptions would not help in resolving
the inverse problem of goal attribution. Because of
these limitations of applicability, we could expect that
the goal attribution mechanisms listed above will have
different strengths and weaknesses when applied to
fulfil the various functions of teleological interpretation
of actions.
4.1 Goal prediction and action anticipation
As the example above suggests, all three mechanisms
are capable of finding a known goal for a familiar
action. Teleological reasoning can search through the
possible end states that an action could potentially
lead to until it finds one that would be reasonably
worth the effort represented by the action. An
iterative retrodictive simulation procedure can also be
applied for this purpose: potential goal conjectures can
be fed into the observer's own action planning system,
and if the output matches the perceived action, the
likely goal of the actor has been found (Gallese &
Goldman, 1998). However, the fastest response in this
situation would be generated by recalling the effect
that is most strongly associated with the perceived
action, as it would not require searching many
potential outcomes. Indeed, it may well be that the
different mechanisms of goal attribution are all
involved when one tries to find a goal for a familiar
action. While the stored action-effect associations
would come up with quick hypotheses about the goal,
simulation procedures and teleological reasoning could
verify these solutions by applying their own criteria.
Goal attribution assists action anticipation by
allowing the observer to break down the path leading
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to the goal state to sub-goals and anticipating their
occurrence in turn. Unless the action sequence is a
well-known routine that is always performed the same
way, action-effect associations are of only limited use
in this type of prediction because they do not take
into account situational constraints. Even if a sub-goal
has been identified (say, pouring water into the coffee
machine), the action-effect mechanism will likely
predict the action that is most strongly associated
with that sub-goal (say, taking water from the tap),
even when that action is unavailable in the given
situation (say, there is no water supply). Action-effect
associations cannot come up with novel actions
(pouring water into the coffee machine from a bottle
of mineral water), because this unfamiliar action has
not been associated during prior experience with the
desired outcome. The assumption that action-effect
associations provide the basic mechanism for
identifying goal-directed actions leads to significant
limitations when it is used for action anticipation and
seems to fail to capture the flexibility that
characterizes human infants’ early competence in this
regard.
In contrast, simulation procedures work well when
one has to generate action predictions for a known
goal state. Considering the question, "What would I
do in that situation to achieve my goal?" can generate
novel predictions, and can flexibly adapt to the
constraints of the actual situation. As long as the
observed individual operates with a similar knowledge
background and motor constraints, simulation is likely
to produce valid action predictions. In fact, we
hypothesize that action simulation and action
mirroring evolved exactly for the purpose of action
monitoring and flexible action anticipation for goal-
directed actions of conspecifics (cf. Csibra, 2005).
Teleological reasoning can also provide novel
action predictions, with the extra benefit of being able
to do so for non-human actors as well. However,
within the more restricted task-domain of predicting
the actions of a conspecific individual, teleological
reasoning can hardly be discriminated from simulation
procedures, because in this case simulation is clearly a
natural and effective way to find the most efficient
action towards a goal state. (After all, the observer
herself is also a biological agent, who is similar to the
observed conspecific in that it normally performs the
most efficient action available to her to achieve a goal
within the constraints of the situation.)
4.2 Social learning
Learning a new action for a certain goal state requires
two skills: finding the relevant element of the observed
action sequence that has played a causal role in
bringing about the desired effect, and storing the link
between this action and the outcome for later use.
The second task is rather trivial and accomplished
easily by an action-effect association mechanism.
Simulation procedures have also been suggested to
play an important role in reproduction of actions
(Iacoboni, 2005; Meltzoff, 2005). For example, one
function proposed for mirror neurons in humans is
that they help us break down observed action
sequences into elementary motor acts and reassemble
them into novel actions (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).
The first task in acquiring a means action by
observation, however, is not trivial. Researchers who
want to develop robots that imitate are routinely
confronted with the problem of how to decide which
aspect of the observed behaviour is to be reproduced
(Breazeal & Scassellati, 2002; Gergely, 2003). Is the
fact that your friend leans forward when she puts the
coffee into the cup relevant? Do you have to
reproduce her pleasurable expression upon smelling
the coffee beans or the melody she hums while making
coffee? Many aspects of observed novel behaviours are
not relevant part of the actual goal-directed action but
are simply superfluous. Neither stored action-effect
associations nor simulation procedures are suitable to
sort these elements apart, because neither of these
mechanisms can be invoked to interpret unfamiliar
actions. What is required for this task is a causal
analysis of the affordance structure of the observed
actions and the artefacts they involve in order to
recover which elements of those actions (and artefact
use) are necessary and sufficient for producing the
desired effect. Teleological reasoning could provide
exactly this kind of analysis.5 There is some evidence
to suggest that chimpanzees seem to be able to apply
some form of teleological reasoning when acquiring
means actions for a desirable goal (Horner & Whiten,
2005).
The other kind of social learning task where
teleological interpretation of actions is essential is
when one has to infer the novel goal of an action
(and/or the function of an artefact) from observation.
The difficulty of this task is that the useful effect of the
behaviour can be either in the far future hence not
observable for the learner (e.g., planting a trap), or
may be embedded in a set of different co-occurring
outcomes of which many will be by-products rather
than goals of the action (e.g., hitting an object with
another object may result in bending one, making a
dent on the other, while producing a sound effect and
sparks, etc.). Action-effect associations would not help
the observer to figure out the goal in these situations,
because the effect (and many times the action as well)
is novel. In fact, relying on learned associations would
mislead the observer when the task is to figure out an
unfamiliar goal state. Similarly, simulation procedures
would either lead to no goal extraction, or would
arrive at a wrong conclusion by asking, "What desire
would make me do this?" Such procedures would
defeat the purpose of social learning of novel goals and
                                                 
5 In fact, when the causal properties of means actions are opaque
for the observer, even teleological reasoning will fail in this task.
Elsewhere we hypothesize that human pedagogy (manifestation of
relevant knowledge embedded in means actions) evolved to assist
human children to acquire opaque means actions (Csibra & Gergely,
2006; Gergely & Csibra, 2005; in press).
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artefact functions, because they would apply
assumptions (replication of known goals, or extension
of own goals to others) that are not valid in the actual
situation.
In contrast, teleological reasoning may provide
useful cues for valid goal attribution in such cases. Its
basic assumption, according to which actors achieve
their goals efficiently, allows the observer to sort the
observed effects in terms of whether there is an easier
way to achieve them than the action that produced
them. The assumption of efficiency also helps to verify
hypotheses about possible future goal states: the more
the action seems to be the best way to achieve the
hypothesized goal, the more likely that it is the real
goal of the action. In many cases, the observer's
knowledge about the causal properties of the objects
involved in the action and about the motor constraints
and preferences of the actor will not be enough for
unambiguous identification of a single goal, but
teleological reasoning will still enable to constrain the
set of possible goal states to be considered sufficiently
for the observer to learn about the function of actions
and artefacts. Relevant background knowledge about
situational factors or higher-order goals pursued may
also be relied on to choose the goal to be attributed
from co-occurring outcomes that are locally equally
efficiently produced by the action. For example, while
producing sparks and driving a nail in may be brought
about equally efficiently by hammering, knowledge of
the larger context and ultimate goal such as building a
wooden house may help teleological reasoning to
choose the latter rather than the former consequence
as the actual goal of the hammering action (as it can
efficiently serve as a sub-goal to the distal goal of
house building, while making sparks cannot).
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a theoretical overview
on the epistemic functions and potential mechanisms
of teleological interpretation of actions. We identified
two basic functions of goal attribution: providing local
predictions and enabling longer-term social learning.
Both functions involve two kinds of inferences
according to the direction of computation between
actions and goals, and both kinds of inferences pose
inverse problems for observers, at least in humans.
In the developmental literature on goal
understanding, three mechanisms have been proposed
to fulfil these functions. The fundamental difference
between these mechanisms originates from the tacit
assumptions that they apply to solve the inverse
problems of goal attribution. When matching these
mechanisms and their assumptions to the functions to
be fulfilled, we found varying degrees of success. The
least flexible mechanism, recalling action-effect
associations, performs well in many cases of goal
prediction because it provides a quick on-line solution
that is likely to be valid. However, when productive
solutions are required, action-effect associations are
less useful. In contrast, simulation procedures provide
new, productive solutions in action prediction
contexts. In other words, one can predict actions that
have never been perceived before by applying the
basic assumptions that simulation procedures
presuppose.
The productivity of teleological reasoning is even
broader, making it possible to attribute goals to non-
human agents, and to come up with previously
unknown functions as goals. This aspect of teleological
reasoning makes it particularly suitable to support
social learning of means actions and artefact functions.
The price to be paid for this flexibility, however, is
lower speed of processing, which is a considerable
disadvantage in on-line tasks, like action and outcome
prediction.
As this summary suggests, we believe that the
three proposed mechanisms of goal attribution do not
compete but complement each other. First, none of
them is better in all situations than the others.
Depending on the task demands and the information
available, one or the other mechanism would provide
faster or more valid answers. Second, these
mechanisms could support each other during their
implementation. For example, the fast effect prediction
provided by action-effect associations can serve as a
starting goal-hypothesis for the teleological reasoning
or simulation systems for verification, and the
solutions provided by teleological reasoning in social
learning situations can be stored as action-effect
associations for subsequent rapid recall.
It is also misleading to characterize one or the
other of these mechanisms as 'innate' or 'learned'. The
basic assumptions that these mechanisms rely upon
are likely to be innate in the sense of not having been
derived from experience. Infants may be innately
biased to associate actions with their outcomes, to
assume some identification with other human beings
(the "like me" hypothesis), and to search for
justification for actions in terms of efficiency. At the
same time, all three mechanisms rely on previously
accumulated experience, and all can support further
learning. Action-effect associations can only work
from the material provided by earlier experience of
such pairings, and accumulate such associations by
storing new ones. Simulation procedures crucially
depend on first-person action experience and
especially on the ability to perform means-end action
sequences, and such motor learning may immediately
allow children to interpret and predict others' actions
as well. Teleological reasoning also requires a
knowledge base to operate on. Evaluating efficiency,
for example, is impossible without some basic
knowledge of physical potentials of objects and agents,
and can even lead to insights into new and relevant
physical or biological constraints. Thus, all three
mechanisms should predict some early successes in
goal attribution, followed by a gradual improvement of
performance during development.
Because the three mechanisms we have discussed
rely on different, and sometimes even conflicting,
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assumptions, they cannot be derived from each other.
Thus, the question of primacy (i.e., which one provides
the 'real' basis of understanding of goal-directed
actions) is the wrong question, which cannot be
answered on conceptual grounds. Just like neither the
'shape from shading' nor the 'depth from occlusion'
mechanism of 3D vision is more fundamental than the
other, the relative contribution of the mechanisms of
teleological interpretation to the development of
understanding goal-directed actions is an empirical,
rather than theoretical, question.
If, however, we contrast the three mechanisms on
a phylogenetic rather than an ontogenetic time scale, it
is more plausible to assume that they are differently
applied. Many species are likely to form action-effect
associations that help them to anticipate the outcome
of observed actions before they have been finished.
The existence of mirror neurons in monkeys also
indicates that simulation procedures are invoked in
action prediction in primates. One study even suggests
that teleological reasoning operates in chimpanzees to
acquire means actions from others (Horner & Whiten,
2005). To our knowledge, however, only humans
apply teleological reasoning to figure out novel goals
and artefact functions from others' actions. We
speculate that this ability represents a human-specific
adaptation to learn actions whose goal is not directly
adaptive and to acquire functions of artefacts, and this
adaptation is also reflected by our obsession to
interpret events in functional terms (cf. Kelemen,
1999).
In addition, the productivity of teleological
reasoning opens up the possibility of stipulating
fictional goal states as well. We have shown previously
(Csibra et al., 2003) that 12-month-old infants infer
the presence of occluded physical objects, or the
achievement of unseen goals, in order to interpret an
event as an efficient goal-directed action. In other
words, if a relevant aspect of reality that would justify
an observed behaviour as a well-formed goal-directed
action is perceptually not directly accessible, infants
can "fill in" the missing element by mentally stipulated
contents and rely on the efficiency assumption to
make such inferences. A recent study by Onishi,
Baillargeon, and Leslie (present issue) suggests that 15-
month-olds can even go one step further and posit
states of the world that are counterfactual to the
perceptual evidence but will allow an observed action
to be interpreted as a goal-directed pretence act.
Briefly, the study demonstrates that infants expect that
sequentially organized actions are directed towards a
specific goal state: a pouring action is anticipated to
result in an outcome state that provides the enabling
condition (liquid in the cup) for a subsequent drinking
action from the same cup. Crucially, infants recognize
the causal and teleological relatedness of these actions
even if no liquid is present and therefore neither the
subgoal nor the final goal is ever achieved. This result
strongly suggests that infants' obsession with goals
make them stipulate a fictional world (Csibra &
Gergely, 1998) in which the observed action would be
an efficient goal-directed action,  decouple this world
from reality (Leslie, 1987) and attribute it to the
actor’s mind. Although mental state attribution clearly
requires further cognitive mechanisms as well,  this
example nicely demonstrates how teleological
obsession and teleological reasoning allow infants to
figure out the contents of mental states that are
necessary to understand pretence acts as well-formed
goal-directed actions within a mentally stipulated
representation of fictional reality. Thus, teleological
reasoning functions not only to assist social learning of
novel means and ends but also to infer mental state
contents from actions.
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